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MECHANISM DESIGN WITH INTERDEPENDENT 
VALUATIONS: EFFICIENCY 
BY CLAUDIO MEZZETTI1 
Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals, or types, of 
all agents. Under the implicit assumption that agents cannot observe their outcome- 
decision payoffs, previous literature has shown that with interdependent valuations and 
independent signals, efficient design is impossible. This paper shows that an efficient 
mechanism exists in an environment where first the final outcome (e.g., allocation of 
the goods) is determined, then the agents observe their own outcome-decision payoffs, 
and then final transfers are made. 
KEYWORDS: Auctions, efficiency, interdependent valuations, mechanism design. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
CONSIDER A WORLD IN WHICH a decision affecting several agents must be made (e.g., 
assets must be allocated). Each agent receives private signals (has private information) 
about his own characteristics, or type. Utilities are quasilinear, the sum of a payoff 
from an outcome decision and a monetary transfer. An agent's outcome-decision pay- 
off depends on his own type, but not the types of the other agents; that is, there are 
no informational externalities. The seminal contributions of Vickrey (1961) and later 
Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973) showed that in such a world an efficient decision 
(one that maximizes the sum of agent's payoffs) can be achieved by using appropriate 
monetary transfers. A Groves mechanism accomplishes this by using transfers that first 
make each agent the residual claimant of the social surplus and then cover any deficit 
with additional charges that do not depend on his own behavior. 
In many practical instances the assumption of private values, or no informational 
externalities, is violated. Informational externalities, or interdependent valuations, are 
present if the payoff of an agent depends not only on his own type, but also on the 
types (or informational signals) of the other agents. Among the many possible exam- 
ples of interdependent valuations, consider the following three situations. A seller has 
private information about the quality of a good or service that he is trying to sell to a 
buyer (Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973)); in a mineral-rights auction bidders have private 
signals about the value (e.g., amount of oil in the tract; Milgrom and Weber (1982)); 
an existing company is either being acquired by one of several rivals, or it is going to 
be split among them, and each rival has different information about the many business 
lines of the company. 
Recently, Maskin (1992), Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), and Jehiel and Moldovanu 
(2001) have demonstrated, in increasing generality, that if informational signals are sta- 
tistically independent, multidimensional (or, if they are single dimensional but a single 
crossing condition is violated), and there are informational externalities, then the effi- 
cient decision rule cannot be implemented by any standard mechanism: incentive com- 
patibility and efficiency are mutually exclusive (see also Ausubel (1997), Bergemann 
1I would like to thank the co-editor and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
This research was started when I was visiting the Department of Applied Mathematics of the 
University of Venice, whose financial support is gratefully acknowledged. 
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and Valimaki (2002), and Perry and Reny (2002)). In these and all previous papers in 
the literature, agents report their types to the designer, as in a standard mechanism de- 
sign problem with private values, but they do not report their (pre-monetary transfer) 
payoffs from the outcome decision after a decision has been made. Implicitly, the lit- 
erature has ruled out the possibility of transfers after each agent has observed his own 
payoff from the outcome decision. 
At one extreme, one might allow the mechanism designer to make a temporary out- 
come decision (e.g., allocation of goods), wait until the agents experience utility, and 
then, based on subsequent reports, determine a final outcome and transfers. The lit- 
erature has focused on the other extreme, where a final outcome and transfers must 
be determined initially. I consider the intermediate case, where a final outcome must 
be determined initially, but transfers can be made after subsequent reports. More pre- 
cisely, I will allow the mechanism designer to set up two reporting stages. In the first 
stage the designer asks about the agents' types. On the basis of these reports, an out- 
come is selected. After the outcome decision has taken effect, the designer asks the 
agents to report their realized payoffs in a second reporting stage. Then transfers are 
finalized that depend on reports in both stages. It turns out that allowing the transfers 
to depend on the payoff reports completely changes the conclusions of the model. It is 
always possible to implement an efficient decision by using the following generalized (or 
two-stage) Groves mechanism. First, the designer implements the outcome that is effi- 
cient given the signal reports of the agents in the first reporting stage. Then, each agent 
is given as a transfer the sum of the outcome-decision payoffs reported by all other 
agents in the second reporting stage. This is sufficient to make each agent a residual 
claimant, and hence gives him the incentive to truthfully report his signals in the first 
reporting stage. As in a Groves mechanism, additional charges that do not depend on 
his reports can be imposed on each agent, so as to balance the budget. 
Since the transfers to all bidders depend on the realized outcome-decision payoffs, 
we can think of the generalized Groves mechanism as containing contingent payments. 
That contingent payments are valuable tools has been pointed out before. For exam- 
ple, in a private values setup, Hansen (1985) and Cremer (1987) (see also Samuelson 
(1987)) showed that if the value of a target firm to the winning bidder in an auction 
becomes publicly known, then the seller can raise its revenue by using contingent pay- 
ments, as opposed to cash auctions. In this paper, beside considering a much more 
general setup, I do not require that information become public, but I rely instead on 
the agents' reports of their own realized payoffs. Thus, the payments in the generalized 
Groves mechanism are contingent on the reported outcome-decision payoffs, not on 
publicly observable and verifiable payoffs.2 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3 
shows that it is always possible to achieve efficient decisions. Section 4 concludes by 
arguing that mechanisms with two reporting stages can also be used to achieve goals 
different from efficiency (e.g., surplus extraction). 
2The generalized Groves mechanism has some flavor in common with the dynamic model in 
Hendel and Lizzeri (2002). They studied the markets for new and used cars and showed that first 
best efficiency can be obtained with a mechanism in which higher valuation buyers lease new cars 
in each period and then report their quality to the dealer when returning them at the end of the 
lease. Lower valuation buyers purchase off-lease cars. 
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2. GENERALIZED REVELATION MECHANISMS 
Consider a mechanism design model with n agents. Each agent has private infor- 
mation about his own type Oi E Oi, where Oi is a closed and bounded subset of Rtmi; 
0 = xn Oi is the set of type profiles and 0 = (0, ..., ,n) is a generic element of 0. Let 
Fi and F_i be the cumulative probability distributions of Oi e Oi and 0_i E -_i = xjiiOj. 
Types are drawn independently across agents; that is, the Oi's are independent ran- 
dom variables. (We already know from Cr6mer and McLean (1985, 1988), McAfee and 
Reny (1992), and more recently McLean and Postlewaite (2001), that efficiency and 
full surplus extraction are possible under general conditions when there is correlation 
of types across agents.) Let o be the state of the world and 2 c IRk be the set of pos- 
sible states of the world. The state of the world is a random variable that depends on 
the agent's types; n(w l0) is the conditional cumulative distribution function of o. Let 
X be the set of possible nonmonetary outcomes (also referred to as decisions, or out- 
come decisions). For example, X could be a subset of a Euclidean space and represent 
the set of possible allocations of private and public goods. Agent i's utility function 
Ui: X x 12 x R -* R depends on the outcome x, the state of the world w, and his mon- 
etary transfer ti, 
(1) Ui(x, o, ti) = ui(x, W) + ti. 
As is common in the mechanism design literature I will assume quasilinear utility; 
I will refer to ui as the outcome-decision payoff. Agent i's expected payoff from out- 
come x, conditional on 0, is 
Vi(x, 6) = f Ui(x, ))dH((ool). 
While with private values ui depends on x and 06, it is standard in the literature on 
interdependent valuations to use a reduced-form model in which the state variable o 
is suppressed and an agent's outcome-decision payoff depends directly on the types 
of all the agents. There are two ways of reconciling the state-of-the-world formula- 
tion with the reduced-form model. First, by interpreting 0 as a vector of signals and 
vi(x, 0) as the outcome-decision payoff. Second, if there exists a function wt)() such 
that H(w)0) = 0 for w < w(O) and H(w(0)10) = 1, then the state of the world is a 
deterministic function of the type profile and agents' payoffs depend directly on 0. 
The reduced-form and the state-of-the-world formulation are equivalent if an agent 
cannot observe his own outcome-decision payoff. However, when an agent can observe 
his own outcome-decision payoff before final transfers are made, as I will assume, the 
state-of-the-world formulation is more general, because it allows for additional noise 
in the payoff. 
In a standard revelation mechanism agents are not asked to report their outcome- 
decision payoffs. Under private values there is no loss of generality in assuming that 
the designer only uses standard revelation schemes. Intuitively, in a set-up with private 
values, observing one's own payoff conveys no new information to an agent and thus 
the designer has no need to collect second-stage messages. With interdependent valua- 
tions and observable outcome-decision payoffs, restricting the designer to use standard 
revelation schemes entails a loss of generality. In general, allowing the designer to col- 
lect any new information enlarges the set of implementable decision functions. Thus, 
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for example, if an agent observes several signals after the outcome decision (e.g., he ob- 
serves his revenue and cost) then the designer should ask the agent to report all these 
signals. In this paper I will assume that the agent only observes the aggregate payoff 
from the outcome and I will study generalized (or two-stage) revelation mechanisms in 
which the designer collects messages in two stages (this is without loss of generality; see 
Mezzetti (2002) for more details on the appropriate version of the revelation principle 
in this setup). The messages collected in the first stage determine the outcome decision 
to be made. The second reporting stage takes place after the agents have observed their 
payoffs from the outcome decision; messages from both stages are used to determine 
the total monetary transfers to the agents. 
ASSUMPTION 1: For any x E X and any realization of the state of the world w, each 
agent i observes his realized outcome-decision payoff ui(x, o) after the final outcome de- 
cision, but before final transfers, are made. 
This assumption is quite plausible in many important economic setting. For exam- 
ple, in auctions for timber and other commodities the winning bidder eventually learns 
the market value of the goods being sold. In a used car market (as in Akerlof's lemon 
model) the buyer learns the car's quality. In a labor market (as in Spence's signaling 
model), employers learn the quality of the workers they employ. In a public good en- 
vironment, citizens learn their payoff from a completed project. In all these cases the 
designer can finalize transfers after the outcome-decision payoffs have been observed. 
One may wonder if the chronological separation between the outcome decision and 
the final transfers does not introduce obstacles to the practical use of the mechanism. 
Thus, suppose that a community has to decide on a public project. While the project 
must be built and financed today, the true payoffs from the project will only be re- 
vealed later, perhaps much later. Is this an insurmountable problem? I do not think 
so. The authority in charge of the project should collect type information and make 
an outcome decision today; today it could also collect fees from the agents based on 
this information to finance the project. After the project has been built, it should col- 
lect information about the realized payoffs and make additional transfers among the 
agents that reflect the new information. In fact, as we shall see in the next section, the 
additional transfers can be constructed so that their expected value is zero. 
In some instances Assumption 1 is less plausible; an example, suggested by a referee, 
is the following. A watch is to be allocated between two agents. Agent 1 has no private 
information. Agent 2's private information consists of his opinion about how the watch 
looks: there are two possibilities, "beautiful" and "ugly." Suppose that agent l's pay- 
off from obtaining the watch depends on agent 2's opinion. Then, even if he gets the 
watch, agent 1 will not observe his outcome-decision payoff, because he cannot observe 
agent 2's opinion. 
3. EFFICIENCY 
The deterministic decision rule x*: -> X is efficient if, for all 0 E 0, it is 





(2) x*(0) E argmax vi(x, 0). 
XEX xeX i=1 
I will assume that (2) is always well defined. 
Consider a standard Groves mechanism in which agents are only asked to report 
their types. Let o0 be the type reported by agent i. Up to a function hi('r) whose ex- 
pected value conditional on Oi is independent of o0, a Groves mechanism imposes the 
following transfers: 
(3) yi( o) = V(x ( o), Or). 
j#i 
Then, assuming that all other agents are truthfully reporting, at the reporting stage 
agent i solves the following maximization problem: 
max f [Li(x*(O, O-i), i, O_i) 
+ vj(x*(O., Oi), 0, _ i) dF_i(O-i). 
j#i 
Contrary to the case of private values, with interdependent valuations, there is no 
reason why 0r = Oi should be the solution to the problem. Thus, a standard Groves 
mechanism will not implement the efficient outcome. The problem is that with inter- 
dependent valuations the functions yi fail to make each agent i the residual claimant 
of the full surplus. This is because the expected outcome-decision payoff of agent j = i, 
as computed by the designer, does not coincide with j's true outcome-decision payoff. 
The former depends directly on i's reported type or, while the latter depends on the 
true type Oi. With private values this problem does not arise, because j's computed 
outcome-decision payoff depends on the reported type or only indirectly through the 
outcome decision x*. 
Now suppose that the designer uses a generalized revelation mechanism. Besides 
reporting a type o0 in the first reporting stage, agent i faces a second reporting stage in 
which he must report an outcome-decision payoff ur. Let the designer use the efficient 
decision rule x*, which only depends on first-stage type reports, but suppose that the 
transfer function is (again, up to a function hi(or) whose expected value conditional on 
Oi is independent of or): 
(4) Ti(r, Ur) = 
j#i 
The idea, as in a standard Groves mechanism with private values, is to make every 
agent the residual claimant of the full surplus. Thus, we can think of this mechanism 
as a generalized (or two-stage) Groves mechanism. To see that these transfers make 
truthtelling an equilibrium, first observe that the report of his outcome-decision pay- 
off does not affect agent i's total utility-because Ti does not depend on it-hence 
it is optimal for agent i to truthfully report his payoff in the second reporting stage. 
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Then, suppose that all agents except i truthfully report their types, ori = 0-i, and their 
outcome-decision payoffs, while agent i of type 0i falsely reports his type to be 0i. 
Under these hypotheses, the reported outcome-decision payoff of agent j is u = 
uj(x*(0 , 0_i), w); thus, for type Oi the expected value of ur is Vj(x*(0, 0_i), oi, 0_i). 
Note that this expected value depends on the implemented decision, which is a func- 
tion of the reported types, and the true type profile. As a result, agent i's total expected 
utility when the true type profile is (0i, 0_i) and he reports 0' becomes 
(5) vi(x*(0;, , i), i, O-i) + 1 vj(x*(09, O-i), i, , i). 
By reporting his true type, on the other hand, agent i would obtain 
(6) vi(x*(0i, ), Oi, i, -i) + vj(x*( 0, 0-i) i, i -). 
jil 
Since x* is the efficient decision, the utility in (6) is at least as great as the utility 
in (5). Hence, agent i will never profit from falsely reporting 0l; truthful reporting is 
a best reply to the truthful reporting of all the other agents. Thus, I have proved the 
following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1: It is always possible to construct an efficientperfect Bayesian two-stage 
mechanism. 
While with private values it is possible to make truthful revelation a dominant strat- 
egy for agents, with interdependent valuations the dominant strategy is lost. However, 
in the proposed mechanism telling the truth is a best reply for agent i independently of 
his beliefs about the other players. That is, telling the truth is an ex-post equilibrium: it 
remains a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for any prior distribution over types. 
With private values the type 0i, learned before participating in the mechanism (the 
interim stage), is both the only piece of private information and all that agent i needs 
to determine his valuation for all outcome decisions. If valuations are interdependent, 
knowing Oi is not sufficient to determine i's valuation. If the outcome-decision payoff is 
observed, however, an agent obtains two pieces of information: his interim type 0i and 
his payoff type ui, which he learns after an outcome decision has been made. Thus, we 
could say that an agent's valuation for the outcome that was chosen (but not necessarily 
all outcomes) is privately known after the outcome-decision payoff has been realized. 
In a sense, observing the outcome-decision payoff brings the interdependent valuations 
model closer to the private values model. 
It is well known that with private values and sufficiently rich domains, an efficient 
mechanism must be a standard Groves mechanism (see Green and Laffont (1977), 
Holmstrom (1979), Laffont and Maskin (1979), and, more recently, Williams (1999)). 
As Example 2 in the next section shows, with interdependent valuations and observable 
payoffs there are other two-stage mechanisms, besides the generalized Groves mecha- 
nism, that yield efficient outcomes. 
A drawback of the generalized Groves mechanism that needs to be stressed is that in 
the second stage agents are indifferent between telling the truth and lying. This implies 
that there might be other equilibria besides the efficient, truth-telling equilibrium. It is 
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an open question whether more complex mechanisms can be constructed that do not 
have this feature. 
The transfers Ti as defined in (4) are made after agents have observed their own pay- 
offs. If, for some reason, the designer needed to make transfers at the outcome-decision 
stage, he could require that the transfers yi, as defined in equation (3), be made at the 
same time the outcome is chosen, and that the transfer adjustments Ti - yi be made 
after outcome-decision payoffs are observed. In equilibrium the expected value of the 
transfer adjustments is zero; in fact all transfer adjustments are exactly equal to zero if 
the state of the world is a deterministic function of the type profile. 
So far, I have not addressed the issues of individual rationality and budget balance. 
The working paper version, Mezzetti (2002), gives a necessary and sufficient condition 
for a generalized Groves mechanism to be budget balancing and individually rational, 
that is, to induce voluntary participation.3 To deal with budget balance, let E_i be the 
expectation operator over the random variable 0_i (with E-(n+l) = E-1) and E be the 
expectation over 0. Consider the following additional charge hi on agent i, first intro- 
duced by D'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) and Arrow (1979): 
n ~ n 
(7) hi(6r) =n E- ̂ jv(-x*(), j r) - Ei ? , j(x*(O:, Oi), i, _i) 
?j=1 _ j=l _ 
n _ r 
+ E-(i+I) L Vj(x*(Or+, _0(i+l)), o+1, 0_(i+l)) 
_j=l _ 
With this additional charge, agent i's transfer becomes ti = ri - hi. Since the ex- 
pected value of hi does not depend on the reports of agent i, truthful reporting remains 
an equilibrium. In the reduced-form model, in which the outcome-decision payoffs de- 
pend directly on the type profile, these transfers balance the budget on the equilibrium 
path, ij= ti = 0. When the state variable o is a random function of the state profile, 
the budget will not be balanced for all realizations of w, but it will be balanced (on 
average) for all type profiles, 
iE t uj(x *(), 
- 
)- hi(0)] dH(wO) = 0. 
(=1 -ji i 
PROPOSITION 2: It is always possible to construct an efficientperfect Bayesian two-stage 
revelation mechanism that balances the budget for all type profiles. 
I now present an example that shows how the results in this section can be applied. 
The example is purposefully simple, to highlight the main ideas. 
EXAMPLE 1: A seller knows the quality Os of a durable good, with 6s E [-1, 1]. The 
quality of the good is unknown to the buyer. A good of quality 0s is worth Os to the 
buyer and it is worth aOs to the seller, where a < 1. Efficiency dictates that the buyer 
3The condition is analogous to the one Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) provided for the case 
of private values. 
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get the good if 0s > 0 and that the seller keep it if 0s < 0. In a standard mechanism 
design model the transfers and the outcome decision depend on the players' reports 
about their types. Let ts be the seller's transfer and suppose that the decision rule is 
efficient. Letting O' < 0 < 0", incentive compatibility requires aO' + ts(s) > ts(0) and 
ts( O) > aO'j + ts( O), which implies 0' > 0', a contradiction. Thus, no efficient standard 
mechanism exists. On the other hand, efficiency can be obtained by using a two-stage 
revelation mechanism. Consider a contract between buyer, seller, and a dealer (the 
designer) stipulating that (i) if the seller reports to the dealer that the quality of the 
good is 6r > 0, then the dealer sells the good to the buyer at a price p = f30r, with 
a <: _ 1; (ii) after acquiring the good the buyer will publicly report her payoff ur and 
the dealer will pay the seller an amount equal to p3u. Under this contract, the seller 
has an incentive to truthfully report the good's quality and the buyer has an incentive 
to report his true payoff from the outcome decision; the outcome is efficient and the 
buyer ends up paying a price /30s to the seller. With these transfers the dealer breaks 
even, that is, the budget is balanced. Furthermore, the agents will want to participate 
in the mechanism; individual rationality is satisfied. 
If types are single dimensional and a single-crossing condition is satisfied, then stan- 
dard revelation mechanisms that implement the efficient decision rule exist even if val- 
uations are interdependent. However, Bergemann and Valimaki (2002) showed that 
no such mechanism provides agents with the incentives for efficient ex-ante informa- 
tion acquisition (see also Maskin (1992)). It is simple to show that this inefficiency 
disappears if the mechanism designer is allowed to condition transfers on the play- 
ers' reports of their realized outcome-decision payoffs. This is because the general- 
ized Groves mechanism that I introduced in this section makes each agent the residual 
claimant of the full surplus and thus it also provides each agent with the incentives for 
the ex-ante efficient acquisition of information. See Mezzetti (2002) for details. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
I have shown that when agents observe their own outcome-decision payoffs, even 
if these payoffs are unverifiable, payments that are contingent on payoff reports (two- 
stage mechanisms) allow the implementation of efficient decisions. This suggests that 
any contractual scheme, or institutional arrangement, that facilitates the use of contin- 
gent payments may raise efficiency. It also helps us understand why, as pointed out by 
Samuelson (1987), "contingent pricing schemes are common in actual practice, where 
examples range from corporate acquisition via exchange of securities, to revenue shar- 
ing in oil lease auctions, and incentive contracts in defense procurement." 
While the focus here has been on efficiency, two-stage mechanisms can also be used 
to implement other decision functions that cannot be implemented by standard mecha- 
nisms. For example, Mezzetti (2002, 2004) shows that by using two-stage mechanisms a 
seller can extract a larger surplus, and sometimes fully extract the surplus as in Cremer 
and McLean (1985, 1988) (see also McAfee and Reny (1992) and McLean and Postle- 
waite (2001)). The reason is that, even if types are independent, with interdependent 
valuations observing his own outcome-decision payoff ui(x, w) provides agent i with 
a signal that is correlated with the types 0_i of the other agents. The following simple 
example gives an idea of how this correlation may be exploited. 
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EXAMPLE 2: An existing business is up for sale. The potential acquirers are two 
firms. Firm i's payoff from acquiring the business is ui = a0i + Oj, j 4 i, where a > 1. 
Firm i privately observes signal Oi, which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Signals are 
independent. It is well known (e.g., see Myerson (1981)), that there is no standard 
mechanism that fully extracts the surplus. On the other hand, consider the following 
generalized two-stage mechanism. In the first stage each firm reports its signal i0. Let f 
be the firm that reported the lower signal, 0[, and h be the one that reported the higher 
signal, o0. Firm h is assigned the business and charged a0O + 0o (i.e., th = -a0o - 0o). 
Firm h is then asked to report its outcome-decision payoff in the second stage. If the 
reported decision payoff is ur = a0r + 0[, then firm f is charged nothing (i.e., tt = 0). 
If ur ao0 + 0o, then firm f is charged a fine F > a (i.e., ti = -F). It is simple to show 
that it is an equilibrium for firm h to truthfully report its outcome-decision payoff in the 
second stage and for both firms to truthfully report their signals in the first stage. Hence 
the proposed mechanism, which is not a generalized Groves mechanism, implements 
the efficient outcome decision and extracts full surplus for all type realizations. In the 
second stage, reporting the true outcome-decision payoff is a best reply for firm h. In 
the first stage, if firm j reports its true signal, then firm i could only gain (over telling 
the truth) by reporting a signal lower then the truth. If firm i reports Or < Oi, it makes an 
expected total payoff (outcome-decision payoff plus transfer) equal to a(0i - o0)0o - 
F(1 - 0r), since Or is the probability that firm j will have a signal lower than 0r, and the 
lie will be detected if firm j acquires the business. This total payoff is always negative 
provided that F > a, while telling the truth guarantees firm i zero total payoff. 
It is natural to ask to what extent the approach of exploiting the observation of pay- 
offs can be extended to general allocation problems with agents' utilities that are not 
quasilinear. To do so would require decomposing the final allocation decision in two 
(or more) stages, with agents observing their payoffs and making reports at the end of 
each stage. With interdependent valuations, this certainly expands (at least weakly) the 
range of implementable final allocations, but the amount of extra freedom that multi- 
ple reporting stages give the designer in this general environment is not clear. On the 
negative side, the generalized Groves schemes defined in Section 3 rely on quasilinear- 
ity, and with private values it is well known that efficient allocations cannot generally 
be implemented if utilities are not quasilinear. On the positive side, payoff reports al- 
low some cross-checking and it is easy to construct examples where this is enough to 
implement efficient allocations that could not be implemented with mechanisms that 
only use a single reporting stage. Further research is needed. 
Dept. of Economics, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 
27599-3305, U.S.A.; mezzetti@email. unc. edu; http://www. unc. edu/-mezzetti/. 
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